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Cheap talk games have been widely used to analyze situations in which a policy
maker needs expert advice. In previous work, agent uncertainty has almost always
been modeled using a single-dimensional state variable. In this paper we prove
that the dimensionality of the uncertain variable has an important qualitative im-
pact on results and yields interesting insights into the \mechanics" of information
transmission. Contrary to the unidimensional case, with more than one dimension
full transmission of information in all states of nature is typically possible, provided
a very simple and intuitive condition is satis¯ed. What really matters in trans-
mission of information is the local behavior senders' indi®erence curves at the ideal
point of the policy maker (receiver), not the proximity of players' ideal point. This
may explain the apparent con°ict between informational theories of committees and
the empirical evidence on the poor alignment of preferences between the Floor and
committees in legislative organizations.
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In 1977, when the United States House of Representatives discussed the \Clean Air Act",
two issues were at stake: on the one hand the impact of the act on the economy (through,
for example, increased unemployment); on the other hand the act's environmental and
health bene¯ts. The optimal decision, clearly, had to deal with this trade-o® and so had
to be conditioned on inside information regarding the likely e®ects. As Austen-Smith
[1990] notes, the lobbies (the auto industry on one side; environmentalists on the other)
had much better information than the House, but, also, had strong biases along one
dimension or the other. Despite the con°icts of interest with the policy maker, their
strategic interaction resulted in the transmission of a good deal of information. The
\interested experts", however, selected strategically the data which they disclosed:
Proponents of tightening regulation on emissions and so forth presented a
host of information on the health and environmental consequences of the bill,
they almost wholly ignored the focus of their opponents who in turn argued
against for the regulation almost exclusively on economic grounds (especially
rising unemployment in the auto industry)(Austen-Smith [1990], p. 408)
The outcome of this \expertise game" was the result of the strategic interaction of
two competing agents with a con°ict of interest along di®erent dimensions of the same
problem. This is an example of a whole class of situations (probably all) in which the
policy decision is multidimensional. Understanding these situations seems important
not only for positive analysis: it is a prerequisite for the optimal design of legislative or
private organizations. This is not a novelty: the literature has paid careful attention to
the organizational implications of information transmission in legislative games1. Yet,
despite its importance, with the notable exception of Austen-Smith [1990]2, almost no
work on information transmission in legislative games has analyzed the implications of
the multidimensionality on the problem; typically, in fact, in cheap talk games the relevant
choice to be made is a point in the real line3. Clearly the unidimensional assumption
is not justi¯ed because it is realistic: but it might be appropriate as a \¯rst order"
approximation if it does not have a qualitative impact on the results. In this case these
models might be seen as \reduced forms" of a more complex environment: for example a
model in which the policy space is multidimensional but the policy makers have only one
1See Gilligan and Krehbiel [1989] and Austen Smith [1991]; for an extensive survey of the topic see
Krehbiel [1991].
2Discussion of Austen-Smith's results will follow.
3This is not a limit only of the literature on information transmission applied to legislative games: no
general theory of cheap talk in multidimensional environment exists.
1dimensional jurisdictions. However, the generality of some results of these works become
questionable if the dimensionality of the problem changes qualitatively the results.
This paper has a main message to convey: the analysis of an environment with more
than one dimension is not just a technical change but is qualitatively di®erent and yields
interesting insights into the study of the e±ciency of information transmission in the
policy making process. In order to prove this conjecture, the analysis in this paper will
follow two logical steps.
First, we will revisit the unidimensional analysis. As we mentioned, all the existing
work on cheap talk games4 is in one dimension. Crawford and Sobel [1982] began this
literature analyzing the case of one informed agent (sender) and an informed principal
(receiver) who makes a decision based on the message of the sender; they prove that no
fully revealing equilibrium exists and characterize a particularly important class of equi-
libria5. Only recently, however, the two-sender case has been analyzed in the pioneering
works of Gibbons [1988], Gilligan and Krehbiel [1989], Austen Smith [1991]; and the more
recent works of Epstein [1997], Krishna and Morgan [1999a] and Krishna and Morgan
[1999b]. Although these works di®er in modelling choices and assumptions, they have
a common trait in line with the result of Crawford and Sobel [1982]: full revelation of
information is not typically achieved even with multiple referrals and the informative-
ness of the equilibria is positively correlated with the proximity of the ideal points of
the experts and the policy maker. However conditions for the non-existence of a fully
revealing equilibrium are not completely characterized6. In the ¯rst section of the paper,
we complete the analyses of the previous papers by showing that even if full revelation is
possible in some cases, these outcomes are supported by equilibria that are not plausible
since they critically rely on an ad hoc construction of out-of-equilibrium beliefs and do
4A cheap talk game is a signalling game in which neither the sender's nor the receiver's payo® depends
on the messages sent: payo®s are only functions of types and the action taken by the receiver.
5Partitional equilibria: they prove that for any perfect bayesian equilibrium there exists a payo®
equivalent partitional equililibrium.
6Krishna and Morgan [1999a] prove that when experts report sequentially no fully revealing equilib-
rium exists; but Gilligan and Krehbiel, who ¯rst have considered the simultaneous report case, do not
prove that when experts report simultaneously no fully revealing equilibrium exists. In e®ect, just a slight
generalization of the model employed by Gilligan and Krehbiel may yield the existence of fully revealing
equilibria. This is true when experts have like biases, as shown by Krishna and Morgan [1999a], but also
it might be true, under some conditions, in the case with opposed biases of the experts with respect to the
policy maker. In the ¯rst section we present a necessary and su±cient condition for the non existence of
a fully revealing equilibrium even in the cases that have not been analyzed before. Krishna and Morgan
[1999b] have, independently from this work, found a su±cient condition for the existence of a f.r.e.
The modelling approach of Austen Smith is rather di®erent and so not directly comparable with the
papers by Gilligan and Krehbiel or Krishna and Morgan. In Austen Smith's paper experts do not observe
the true state but a sample of drawings from a known distribution of it. In this approach, more than the
concept of fully revealing equilibrium is relevant the concept of \coherence" of the equilibrium.
2not survive a simple re¯nement. The conclusion that we draw from this section is that in
one dimension there is no equilibrium with good properties in which information is fully
revealed.
Given this, we proceed to the multidimensional problem. The main result of this
section and of the paper is that if there are 2 dimensions and 2 experts with a mild
con°ict of interest, then there exists a fully revealing equilibrium that survives the above
intuitive re¯nements: under the assumption of quadratic utilities, we require ideal points
to be linearly independent7. The result is interesting because it is essentially qualitative:
if ideal points are \just an "" linearly independent (for example if xi and xj are the
ideal points of the experts, then xi = ®xj + ") then the result holds; therefore the non-
existence of fully revealing equilibria is not a \continuous" result in the dimensionality of
the problem. The result is robust to changes in a) the information structure, since, even if
experts do not know the ideal point of the other expert, the equilibrium exists; b) timing
of referrals, since even if agents report sequentially, provided a very simple and intuitive
condition on the direction of the highest increase in the experts' utility at the policy
maker's ideal point is satis¯ed, the equilibrium exists. Even more than the existence
result, we believe that the analysis yields important insights into the \mechanics" of
transmission of information that are true also in more general frameworks:
1. Importance of the local behavior of the experts' indi®erence curves at the ideal point
of the policy maker. As we said, a typical result of unidimensional cheap talk games
is that the closer the ideal points, the more information transmitted in equilibrium8.
However, if the informational theory of legislative organizations is to be accepted, there
is a substantial empirical puzzle. As Londregan and Snyder[1994] put it:
The dominant view among congressional scholars is that many congres-
sional committees and sub committees are not representative of the entire
chamber from which they are selected but instead have a relatively strong pref-
erence for serving particular interests (Londregan and Snyder [1994], p.233)
Although formal empirical analyses have presented mixed results, even the empirical
studies that support more the informational theory, show signi¯cant violation of the \out-
7When the outcome space is <d, and utilities are strictly concave, an ideal point is a well de¯ned
vector in <d: If we normalize the policy maker's ideal point at zero, linear independence means that
experts ideal point can not be expressed as x1 = ®x2 for ® 2 <: See below for details.
8Krehbiel states it as one of the \¯ve principles of legislative signalling" :
THE OUTLIER PRINCIPLE. The more extreme are the preferences of a committee
specialist relative to preferences of a non specialist in the legislature, the less informative
is the committee ...the outlier principle is the most robust property of legislative signalling
models. (Krehbiel [1991], p 81)
3lier principle". For example, although Krehbiel [1991] ¯nds that many committees have
no signi¯cant ideological bias relative to the °oor9, he also ¯nds that one third of the
committees has statistically signi¯cant ideological bias10: Foreign A®airs, Education and
Labor, Post O±ce and Civil Service, Armed Services, District of Columbia. The results
of the empirical work of Londregan and Snyder [1994] are pretty drastic:
These results are inconsistent with the implications of models that empha-
size the asymmetric information problems arising from committee expertise...
(Londregan and Snyder [1994], p.262)
Very little work has been done to reconcile theory with empirical evidence. The
only theoretical solution to this puzzle has been provided by the theory of congressional
hearings by Diermeier and Feddersen [1998]: the authors prove that even when the ideal
points of the experts are not close to the policy maker's, there may be transmission of
information. Hearings, in fact, under very plausible assumptions11 work as signalling
devices for commissions (experts) and allow transfers of information.
In this paper, we show that when the analysis is multi-dimensional, the evidence
described above is not at odds with an informational theory of legislative organizations.
In a multidimensional setting, we prove that even experts with extreme preferences may
provide useful information, even if costly signalling is not allowed12. What really matters
for the existence of a fully revealing equilibrium in this case is the local behavior of experts'
utilities at the ideal point of the policy maker. If utilities are di®erentiable, the gradient of
utilities at the policy maker's ideal point is crucial to existence, a result that has the °avor
of the existence results in the social choice literature13. The theory presented therefore
questions the \outlier principle" as a characterizing feature of legislative signalling models,
but provides strong support for the informational theory of legislative organizations.
2. Open rule vs. closed rule. The multi-dimensional case yields useful insights into
the analysis of the \open rule" vs. \closed rule" question, a classic topic of analysis in
the legislative cheap talk games (see Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989, 1990). In the
one-dimensional setting, the meaning of \closed rule" is obvious: having a \closed rule"
power in one dimension means that the policy maker is constrained to choose between
the proposal and the status quo; there is no question about in which dimension power is
granted. In the multi-dimensional case considered in this paper, however, dimensions are
9Krehbiel [1989] uses uses Americans for Democratic Action ans American Conservative Union ratings.
10See Krehbiel [1989] p.128.
11Hearings must be costly and somewhat informative.
12Since hearings are costly the model of Diertmeier and Feddersen is not a cheap talk model but a
signalling model.
13See for example Plott [1967] or Austen Smith and Banks for an extensive survey [1998].
4endogenous14. With some degree of approximation, we may imagine a two stage process:
¯rst the policy maker decides the jurisdictions on which the expert is granted a closed
rule proposal power, then the expert makes the proposal. This has interesting empirical
implications: in equilibrium, we may observe that all the proposals of the expert are
accepted by the policy maker, and this may be interpreted as evidence that the expert has
a dominant position. However, when the ex ante choice is considered the interpretation
may be inverted: the policy maker may have chosen optimally the dimension over which
the expert reports in order to exploit his con°ict of interest with other experts; the choice
of the jurisdiction may be, as we will see, such that the optimal choice of the expert
coincides with that of the policy maker. So the policy maker is really in a dominant
position.
3. Separation of power and allocation of jurisdictions. More generally, to the extent
that we may divide the policy space along dimensions, this approach allows us to discuss
the issue of the allocation of jurisdictions and decision power. A government, in fact, is
a set of agents and interacting rules designed to take decisions in multi-dimensional policy
spaces15; similarly, a committee in the Congress is not a single agent, but a set of agents
with a collective internal organization. The importance of the organization is strictly
related to the multidimensionality of the policy space . Tasks inside the policy maker's
organization are allocated as jurisdictions on subsets of the policy space dimensions: with
only one dimension it is di±cult to imagine the meaning of \jurisdictions". The natural
question is then how much jurisdictions matter in the decision process. In some sense
the analysis here parallels the approach that regards the ¯rm as an organization and not
simply as a black box. In the presence of multiple equilibria the ex ante allocation of
jurisdictions may have important \focal" e®ects on the selection of the ¯nal outcome.
1.1 Related literature
The importance of multidimensionality in spatial models of voting has been recognized at
least since the sixties with extensions of the Hotelling model by Davis and Hinich [1966]
and the equilibrium conditions for existence discovered by Plott [1967]16. However in
models of legislative organization and in cheap talk games in general, as we said, very
little work has been done. Austen-Smith [1993], actually, is the only work that addresses
the problem. Austen-Smith has a modelling approach that is completely di®erent from
the one described here and employed in other papers (Gilligan and Krehbiel [1987], Epstein
14We will be more precise on this later, for now note that one point in <2 is represented by the two
coordinates of some coordinate system, each coordinate is a dimension of the policy space
15See Laver and Shepsle [1994] on this.
16See also Austen-Smith and Banks [1998] for an excellent survey.
5[1998], Krishna and Morgan [1999]): experts do not observe the true state of the world but
a random sample from a known distribution. This approach is more realistic but more
di±cult to analyze. In one dimension, it yields very elegantly clear and general results,
but in more than one dimension becomes exceedingly di±cult to analyze: therefore in the
multidimensional case it has not been possible to characterize general results, but only to
present some examples. The examples of Austen-Smith, however, yield very interesting
intuitions that are completely in line with the results of this paper. Although we do not
study the choice of specialization in information production (as Austen-Smith does), we
con¯rm Austen Smith intuition that experts will be in°uential only on some dimension
of the policy space and therefore will argue on \orthogonal issues".
Another work on information transmission in a multidimensional setting is Milgrom
and Roberts [1986]. There are two main di®erences between it and our work. First,
Milgrom and Roberts assume that information is veri¯able: experts may conceal informa-
tion, but they can not lie. Second, we prove that thanks to multidimensionality we can
achieve full revelation; they prove that despite multidimensionality (and if information is
veri¯able), we may ¯nd a fully revealing equilibrium. In this sense, multidimensionality
makes the disclosure game more complicated, but it does not change it qualitatively.
This paper is also related to Farrell and Gibbons [1989]. In our model each declara-
tions by an Expert has an externality on the relationship between the other Expert and
the Receiver. In particular, the set on which the Expert is in°uential is conditional on
the other Expert's message. The multidimensionality of the problem helps to best exploit
these externalities. In Farrell and Gibbons, there is only one Expert but two Receivers:
the declaration of the Expert to one Receiver has an externality on the relationship that
the Expert has with the other Receiver. The authors prove that these externalities may
be exploited to extract more informative signals from the Sender.
2 The model
Policy space, players, preferences. Let Y ´ <d denote the set of alternatives for the policy
maker. Following Austen Smith and Riker (1987), we distinguish between the policy space
and the outcome space. Policy choices do not coincide with outcomes. For any decision
of the policy maker (y 2 Y ), the outcome is x = y + µ where µ is a d-dimensional vector.
Nature chooses µ according to some continuous distribution function F(µ) with density
f(µ); support £ and zero expected value. The most reasonable assumption is that the
domain of µ is not restricted a priori: although, in fact, extreme states may occur with
negligible probability, we do not want to rule them out. So, if not otherwise speci¯ed,






Figure 1: If the state is µ and the policy maker chooses y, the outcome is x: With
simmetric information the optimal choice for the policy maker is y¤ = ¡µ:
the outcome is x. With symmetric information, the optimal choice for the policy maker,
if the ideal point is the origin, is y¤ = ¡µ. As in Austen Smith and Riker (1987) and
Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989) the policy maker chooses y without knowledge of µ. The
experts instead observe the realization of nature. This is the central asymmetric feature
of the model.
There are three players and each of them has Von Neumann Morgenstern utility func-
tion ui : X ! <. We assume that the uis are continuous, strictly concave, di®erentiable.
The ¯rst two agents are called experts (the set of experts is E), each expert has an ideal
point xi. The policy maker has ideal point xp that we normalize to be at the origin, i.e.
xp =
¡ !
0 2 <p: For simplicity we will assume quadratic utilities, but this assumption is










is the j coordinate of i's ideal point: Utility functions (and therefore ideal points) are
common knowledge.
Timing. The timing of the interaction is as follows: a) at time 0 nature chooses µ
according to F(µ) and each Expert observes the true µ ; b) at time 1 the Experts are
asked to report simultaneously or privately the state of nature µ to the policy maker; c)
the Policy Maker decides y and the outcome that is realized is x = y + µ.
Strategies and equilibrium. A strategy for the policy maker is a function y : £££ ! Y ,
7i.e. for each couple of declarations of the experts associates an element of Y 17. A strategy
for the ith expert is a function si : £ ! £, for each realization of nature the expert
reports µ 2 £ . A belief function for the policy maker is a function ¹ : £ ££ ! P(£)18:
for each pair of proposals of the experts assesses a posterior probability distribution over
£. An equilibrium is de¯ned as follows:
De¯nition 1 An equilibrium in d dimensions with 2 experts is a collection of strategies
y(s1;s2);si(µ) 8i 2 f1;2gand a belief ¹(s1;s2) such that:
a) 8i 2 f1;2g si(µ) maximizes Eui given y(s1;s2);s¡i(µ);
b) y(s1;s2) maximizes Eup given si(µ) 8i 2 f1;2g and ¹(s1;s2)
c) ¹(s1;s2)(µ) is formed using experts' strategies si(µ) by using Bayes' rule whenever
possible.
Afully revealing equilibrium is anequilibrium in whichfor each truestate µ, ¹¤(s¤
1(µ);s¤
2(µ))(µ) =
1: i.e. for any state of the world information is perfectly transmitted in equilibrium. Note
that it is di±cult to achieve a fully revealing equilibrium because the policy maker's action
must be sequentially rational. If the policy maker could commit to a policy response
to the declarations of the experts, then it would be much easier to implement a fully
revealing equilibrium with strategies of the type: \if the experts's reports disagree, the
policy maker would choose a policy that is bad for everyone", this is generally possible
but would not be sequentially rational.
It is useful to introduce a further de¯nition and a simple lemma. In a fully revealing
equilibrium, as de¯ned in the previous paragraph, the true state is always revealed to the
policy maker: however this does not imply that in equilibrium experts report the truth,
any function of the true state will do as well if the policy maker `understands' it: this
multiplicity of equilibria is a well known characteristic of cheap talk games. We de¯ne
a truthful fully revealing equilibrium a fully revealing equilibrium in which experts report
what they observe truthfully.
Lemma 1 If there exists a fully revealing equilibrium then there exists a truthful fully
revealing equilibrium. If the truthful fully revealing equilibrium has non degenerate out
of equilibrium beliefs (i.e. beliefs that assign positive probability to more than one state
of nature), then there exists a truthful fully revealing equilibrium with degenerate out of
equilibrium beliefs, i.e. beliefs that assign probability to only one state of nature.
17Given the assumption of strict concavity of utilities, we might restrict attention to pure strategies
without loss of generality.
18P(£) is the set of probability distributions over £.
8Proof. In the appendix.
This simple lemma is useful in proving the non existence of a fully revealing equi-
librium: if we prove that no truthful fully revealing equilibrium exists than the lemma
implies that no fully revealing equilibrium exists. The intuition of the lemma is very
simple. The ¯rst part is similar to the revelation principle; in the second part (degen-
erate beliefs) we show that for any belief ¹(s1(µ);s2(µ)) the optimal choice of the policy
maker is y(s1(µ);s2(µ)) = ¡E¹(s1(µ);s2(µ))(µ): Then for any belief we construct a degenerate
belief that assigns probability one to E¹(s1(µ);s2(µ))(µ): the equilibrium with these beliefs is
outcome equivalent to the original one.
3 Results
3.1 Fully revealing equilibria in one dimension
In this section we study the problem of fully extracting information from experts in a one
dimensional setting. The goal of this section is to ¯nd conditions for the existence of
fully reveling equilibria in order to compare the results with the case of higher dimensional
policy spaces. The intention here is, more than to present previous work, to extend and
unify its results in a general framework.
Gilligan and Krehbiel [1989] ¯rst analyze a cheap talk model with multiple referrals,
heterogeneous preferences and asymmetric information along one dimension. They ¯nd
an equilibrium of the game that is not fully revealing and draw inferences on it, but they
do not prove the non existence of a fully revealing equilibrium. However, as Krishna
and Morgan [1999a] show, once we consider a slightly more general model, it is not
obvious that no fully revealing equilibrium exists. Consider, for example, the case in
which experts have like biases (i.e. ideal points are both larger (smaller) than the policy
maker's): equilibria with full revelation always exist and, moreover, involve very simple
strategies. Assume, for example, that xi > 0 for i = 1;2; consider these beliefs and
strategies: ¹(s1(µ);s2(µ))(maxfs1(µ);s2(µ)g) = 1; si(µ) = µ for i = 1;2; y(s1(µ);s2(µ)) =
¡maxfs1(µ);s2(µ)g: Given the beliefs of the policy maker and i's strategy, ¡i ¯nds
optimal to reveal the truth. This equilibrium survives as a PBE19. In a subsequent
paper, independent from our research, Krishna and Morgan [1999b] show that, in exactly
the same model of Gilligan and Krehbiel [1989], if biases of the experts are very small,
then there is a f.r.e.: however, they do not completely characterize the conditions in which
a fully revealing equilibrium exists.
Full characterization of conditions for the existence of fully revealing equilibria in
19This equilibrium, however does not survive if experts make mistakes with arbitrary small probability.
9one dimension is clearly important for the purposes of this paper, in order to put in
perspective the results in higher dimensions: but it has also considerable interest in its
own. Situations in which experts do not report sequentially seem the norm since policy
makers do not generally disclose the advice of their experts. In this section therefore we
make two points. In Proposition 1 we ¯nd a necessary and su±cient condition for the
existence of a fully revealing equilibrium when experts report simultaneously and have
opposed biases. In Propositions 2, however, we show that even if the conditions are
violated, or if experts have like biases, no fully revealing equilibrium survives an intuitive
re¯nement.
The key to the existence of a fully revealing equilibrium in one dimension is £, i.e. the
support of the variable µ. The ¯rst result of this section is that when £ is large enough
the policy maker can achieve a fully revealing equilibrium even if the agents have opposed
biases. De¯ne in this one-dimensional setting £ = [¡W;W] 20: The intuition behind
the fact that fully revealing equilibria may exist is the following. Nothing prevents the
policy maker from having out of equilibrium beliefs that are conditional on the observed
messages. Notice that if this is the case, then deviations from a fully-revealing equilibrium
become more di±cult because declarations reveal some information about the true state
of world. When an expert contemplates a deviation from a fully revealing equilibrium, in
fact, he must assume that the other expert and the policy maker follow the equilibrium
strategies: therefore the expert knows that some information is revealed to the policy
maker by the other expert even if he deviates. The larger W, the more freedom we have
to ¯nd the function ¹(s1;s2) and so the larger is the set of equilibria.
Krishna and Morgan [1999a] prove the non existence of a fully revealing equilibrium
when experts report sequentially. In the following proposition we analyze the case of
simultaneous reports and opposed biases (assume w.l.g. that x1 < 0, x2 > 0).
Proposition 1 If d = 1 and the experts' ideal points (x1; x2) are on opposite sides of the
policy maker's ideal point, then jx1j+jx2j > W is a necessary and su±cient condition for
the non existence of a fully revealing equilibrium
Proof. In the appendix
In proving Proposition 1 in the appendix, we show that if W ¸ jx1j + jx2j there is an
entire class of equilibria that would be fully revealing; an example is the following:
20For simplicity we assume that the support is symmetric, but the result is clearly not driven by this
assumption.
10si(µ) = µ for i 2 f1;2g
¹(s1;s2)(s1) = 1 if s1 = s2
¹(s1;s2)(
s1+s2
2 ) = 1 s1 ￿ s2
¹(s1;s2)(¡W) = 1 s1 > s2 and s1 ¸ 2x2 ¡W
¹(s1;s2)(W) = 1 s1 > s2 and s1 < 2x2 ¡ W
y(s1;s2) = ¡¹(s1;s2)
The equilibria constructed in the proof of Proposition 1 and the one displayed above
are just theoretical possibilities and we do not claim that any of them is plausible. For
example, notice that in the equilibrium above, if s1 > s2 and both are near zero, the
policy maker believes that the state is extreme (W or ¡W): this does not seem plausible
but it is necessary in order to discourage deviations, since the policy maker can not
determine which expert has deviated. For this reason we arguein favor of a re¯nement that
eliminates these equilibria. The existence of a fully revealing equilibrium in the previous
Proposition relies on the fact that following an out-of-equilibrium pair of messages we are
able to construct ad hoc beliefs that support the desired outcome. The assumption that
the support of µ is bounded is a radical way of restricting out of equilibrium beliefs: since
no state is larger than W, clearly no out of equilibrium belief can put weight on states
larger than W. The a priori assumption that the support is bounded, however, is not a
good assumption, and it is not necessary for restricting out-of-equilibrium beliefs. There
is not a widely accepted way to re¯ne beliefs in games with a continuum of types. We
introduce a simple re¯nement on out-of-equilibrium beliefs that parallels consistency in
the Sequential Equilibrium concept and has a straightforward interpretation.
We de¯ne an "¡perturbed game as the game described above in which each Expert i
independently observes the true state of nature with probability 1¡"i and with probability
"i observes a randomstatee µ: a randomvariable with continuous distribution Gi(¢), density
gi(¢) and the same support as µ. We may interpret this as a situation in which each expert
may commit a mistake with probability "i or with this probability he is not an expert.
In an "-perturbed game, the policy maker has well de¯ned beliefs following any pair of
messages µ;µ
0; for any prior f(µ), beliefs depend on " = ("1;"2), G(¢) = (G1(¢);G2(¢))
and the Experts strategies: ¹(G;"n;s¤(µ)): An equilibrium is "-stable if there exists
a pair of distributions Gi(¢) for i = 1;2 and a sequence "n = ("n
1;"n
2) converging to
zero such that out-of-equilibrium beliefs of the equilibrium are the limit as "n ! 0 of
the beliefs that the equilibrium strategies would induce in an "n-perturbed game: i.e.
¹(G;"n;s¤(µ)) ! ¹¤(s¤(µ)). The idea behind this restriction on beliefs is very simple.
In equilibrium, after a pair of messages that are inconsistent, the policy maker believes
that at least one of the Experts has made a mistake. Given the distribution of the state
11of nature and the distribution of the wrong observation, the policy maker will assign a
posterior probability to the event that each Expert has observed the wrong variable and
with this posterior he accesses a belief on the state of nature. We require that there
exist a Gi(¢) i = 1;2 and a sequence "n such that this process may be rationalized: this
requirement imposes consistency on the construction of the posterior beliefs. As we
said, it is not possible to generalize the concept of Sequential Equilibrium to cases with
a continuum of agents. However, our restriction of out-of-equilibrium beliefs parallels
the consistency requirement in Sequential Equilibrium. In order to have consistency in
Sequential Equilibrium, in fact, we perturb strategies in order to have well de¯ned beliefs
and we require out-of-equilibrium beliefs to be the limit of these. The perturbation of the
model that we introduce may be seen in this way: each Expert i follows the equilibrium
strategy with probability 1 ¡ "i and with probability "i follows a mixed strategy with
density equal to the distribution of the wrong observation, Gi(¢). We require beliefs to
be consistent with this perturbation as " ! 0: Note that we are not making a speci¯c
assumption regarding the distribution of the wrong observation in order to preserve as
much generality as possible to the restriction in believes.
Given this de¯nition, we have:
Proposition 2 If d = 1 and both x1 and x2 are large enough in absolute value, then there
exists no " ¡stable fully revealing equilibrium for any W 2 (¡1;+1).
Proof. In the appendix
Before moving on to the two dimensional case, it is useful to summarize the results of
this section:
1) In a more general environment than Gilligan and Krehbiel [1989] it is possible to
construct fully revealing equilibria (f.r.e.) with just two experts and one dimension. We
have found a simple necessary and su±cient condition for existence of a f.r.e.
2) Even when they exist, these f.r.e. are not plausible because, at least for x1 and x2
large, they rely on an ad hoc construction of out of equilibrium beliefs and therefore do
not survive a simple re¯nement.
The aim of the following section is to show that, once we consider the problem in
two dimensions, the result drastically changes. The change is qualitative and yields
interesting intuitions on the process of transmission of information.
123.2 Equilibrium in two dimensions
3.2.1 Simultaneous referrals
The intuition behind the main result of this section is easily understood by considering a
particular case. See Figure 2: in this case each expert has preferences that are perfectly
aligned with the policy maker in one and only one dimension. Expert 2's ideal point,
for example, lies in the x axis so he has the same preferences as the policy maker with
respect to the y dimension. However, both experts prefer point A to (0;0): Consider the
strategies: expert i tells the truth on both dimensions; the policy maker believes each
Expert on the dimension on which their preferences are aligned. For example, assume
A is the true state of world: the policy maker will believe that the x coordinate of A is
equal to the x coordinate of the declaration of Expert 1; and that the y coordinate of A
is equal to the y coordinate of the declaration of Expert 2.
With symmetric information, the policy maker would choose A0 in order to achieve
(0;0). Consider the decision of Expert 1. Given that Expert 2 tells the truth the outcome

























But then the optimal choice for Expert 1 is to be honest!: given Expert 2's strategy,
Expert 1 knows that his message will induce an outcome on the x axis; given the assump-
tion of this example (Expert 1's ideal point on the y coordinate, quadratic utilities) the
optimal point on the x axis for Expert 1 is the origin. The same holds for Expert 2 and
clearly the strategy is optimal for the policy maker who obtains for any µ his ideal point.
Note that A is a pareto improvement for both Experts but, they can not achieve it in
equilibrium. Suppose that the two experts can communicate before the message are sent
and, therefore, potentially can collude: this, however, would not be an equilibrium. If
Expert 2 lies and reports zero the outcome, as a function of the strategy of 1 s1(µ) would
be x = µ ¡ ¹ = (µx ¡ s1(µ);µy) (a point on the dotted line in Figure 2): but then the
optimal choice of 1 is s1(µ) = µx (point B in ¯gure 2) and the action of 2 would not be
optimal.
As Proposition 3 shows, this argument may be generalized for the case where the ideal
points of the agents are linearly independent.
Proposition 3 If d = 2; then for any x1 and x2 such that x1 6= ®x2 8® 2 <, there
exists a fully revealing, "-stable equilibrium.








If 2 deviates and reports
(0,0), 1 induces a point
on this line: here the
optimal pick is B.
Figure 2: A special case where ideal points are on orthogonal axes. Each expert's
preferences are aligned with the policy maker's on one and only one dimension.




2; rui(0;0) ¢ z = a
ª
(1)
The locus li(a) has a simple geometric interpretation (see Figure 3): li (0) is the
tangent of the indi®erence curve of the ith agent at the ideal point of the policy maker;
for any a 2 <; li (a) identi¯es one and only one line parallel to li(0): Notice that, given
the assumption that @® 2 < such that x1 = ®x2; 8a1 2 <; 8a2 2 <; l1(0) and l2(0)
are linearly independent vector spaces22: therefore 8µ 2 <2; there exists a unique vector
(a1;a2) 2 <2 such that:
µ = l1(a1) \ l2(a2) (2)
We may de¯ne the function a(µ) : <2 ! <2 that, for each µ, associates the couple
a1(µ);a2(µ) uniquely de¯ned by (2).
It is routine to prove:
Claim 1 8(a;b;c;d) 2 < :
228® 2 l1 (µ); 8¯ 2 l2 (a2) then ® and ¯ are linealy independent.
14li(a) \ lj (b) + li (c) \ lj (d) = li (a + c) \ lj (b + d) (3)
We are now ready to prove the proposition. Each expert is required to report a
number, si
23. Consider the following strategies and beliefs:
si (µ) = aj (µ) 8i;j = 1;2 i 6= j (4)
¹(s1(µ);s2(µ)) = l1(s2(µ)) \ l2(s1(µ)) (5)
y (s1(µ);s2(µ)) = ¡¹(s1(µ);s2(µ)) (6)
We claim that these strategies and this belief are an " ¡ stable equilibrium. Given
the other players' strategies, player i, choosing b si; may induce a point:
µ ¡ ¹(sj (µ);b si) = µ ¡ li (sj (µ)) \ lj (b si) by (5)
= µ ¡ li (ai (µ)) \ lj (b si) by (4)
= li(ai(µ))\lj (aj (µ))¡li (ai(µ))\lj (b si) by de¯nition of a(µ)
= li (0) \ lj (aj (µ) ¡ b si) by claim 1.
Since b si is any number in <; agent i may choose any value for (aj (µ) ¡ b si) and so
any point in li(0): But, by construction, ui has a unique point of tangency with li (0):
the origin, i.e. the ideal point of the policy maker. The origin is the optimal outcome
that i may induce, so the optimal strategy is to set b si = aj (µ), as prescribed by the
equilibrium. Therefore, there is no pro¯table deviation for agent i, 8i = 1;2: Clearly
beliefs are consistent and the policy choice is optimal given the beliefs. The requirements
for ²-stability follow since there is no out of equilibrium message pair and therefore believes
are always well de¯ned.
The key point in understanding the general case is that if x1 and x2 are linearly
independent, we can construct two axes that span the policy space and exploit the con°ict
of interest between the two experts exactly in the same way as in the particular case
described above. See Figure 3: x1 and x2 are generic l.i. vectors in <2: Given quadratic
utilities, the tangents at (0;0) of the respective utilities are l.i.: so they span. Note that
if agent i had to choose an outcome in li(0) he would choose (0;0); i.e. the ideal point of
23Clearly, we can construct an equilibrium in which each agent is required to report any sequence of
numbers and the policy maker ignores all of them except one. The case in which each expert is required
to report a couple of numbers is particularly interesting since it may seem natural: we may interpret it
as each agent being required to report the \coordinates" of µ: In the equilibrium that we will construct,
the number that is reported will be a truthful coordinate of µ; since the other coordinate is ignored, one







Figure 3: The general case: it is possible to construct a new coordinate system to exploit
experts con°ict of interest.
the policy maker; but in equilibrium this is exactly what is going to happen. Agent j in
fact will be honest on the lj dimension so i is forced to choose in li(0):
Notice that if x1 and x2 are linearly dependent, then this equilibrium is not possible: in
this case l1 and l2 would coincide and so they would not span the entire space. However,
if x1 and x2 are `just an " linearly independent (for example x1 = ®x2 + ", ® 2 <) then
the result holds. This shows that the multi-dimensional analysis is qualitatively very
di®erent from the uni-dimensional.
A few characteristics of this equilibrium seem important. The ¯rst is that, as in
the special case described above, the equilibrium is collusion proof. This seems a very
important property: to remain in the case of two informed lobbies and a policy maker (the
example in the introduction that motivated the paper) the possibility of secret agreements
16between lobbies is more than plausible and it is not desirable to rule it out. Note that this
property of the equilibrium is far from being obvious. For example, the equilibrium that
Krishna and Morgan [1999a] ¯nd in one dimension with like biases is not collusion proof.
Assume that both experts prefer a higher action than the policy maker: in Krishna and
Morgan [1999a] the policy maker believes that the state is the largest of the messages
sent, so no expert has a strictly preferred deviation if the other reports the truth; if,
however, experts meet before sending the messages, they may decide to send messages
with a negative bias: this would be an equilibrium since none of them has anything to
lose from this type of coordination.
We may formalize this point. In particular we want to formalize the concept of collu-
sion proofness of an equilibrium. For any equilibrium fy¤(¢;¢);s¤
1(¢);s¤
2(¢);¹¤(¢;¢)g we may
de¯ne the induced game ¡(y¤) as a game where the players are the two experts, strategies
are the same as before, and utilities are de¯ned: e ui (s1;s2) = ui(µ + y¤(s1;s2)): Clearly
the original equilibrium is an equilibrium of this game, but there may be other equilib-
ria. Assume that there exists an equilibrium that pareto dominates s¤
1(µ);s¤
2(µ)24: If we
assume that agents may communicate before playing the game, then the original game
would be at least suspect: agents would coordinate on the pareto superior equilibrium.
Therefore we may de¯ne:
De¯nition 2 An equilibrium of the original expertise game is collusion proof if the in-
duced game ¡(y¤) has no pareto superior equilibria.
This de¯nition does not coincide with de¯nitions used in other work on collusion25.
In this literature, collusion is ruled out if players can not coordinate on an action that it
is strictly pareto superior. In this sense the re¯nement is inspired by Aumann's Strong
Nash Equilibrium concept. In order to pursue this approach, however, it is necessary to
assume that players can sign binding agreements at the colluding stage26: this seems a
strong assumption. The approach followed in this paper, on the contrary, is in line with
the Coalition Proofness concept introduced by Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston [1987].
The structure of the model and the role of players allow us to restrict attention to the
coalition formed only by Experts. What is important, is that the coalition of Experts
can not commit to a join strategy. This is consistent with the structure of the model
because it preserves its non cooperative nature.
Using De¯nition 2, we have:
24At least one agent is strictly better and both are not worse o®.
25See for instance Tirole [1992] or Baliga [1999].
26It is not necessarily true, in fact, that a pro¯le of strategies that yields the pareto improvement is a
nash equilibrium.
17Proposition 4 Given that utilities are quadratic and x1 6= ®x2 8® 2 <, the equilibrium
constructed in Proposition 3 is collusion proof.





2(µ); which clearly must induce an outcome di®erent from the origin. The following















i(µ))) = 0 8i = 1;2 (7)
The ¯rst term of the LHS of (7) is the direction of allowed deviation for agent i at
equilibrium, the second is the gradient of i's utility at the equilibrium outcome. Condition
(7) means that for each agent, at the equilibrium outcome, the indi®erence curve of the
agent must be tangent to the direction of allowed deviation for the agent, if this is not
true then there is a pro¯table deviation. Given quadratic utilities, the locus of possible
outcomes with this property is the line connecting the ideal point of agent i with the
origin: however the intersection of these two loci contains only the origin since xi 6= ®xj.
Proposition 5 actually proves more than is required for De¯nition 2: in ¡(y¤) there is
a unique equilibrium. However, while the results presented before hold for any strictly
concave utility of the Experts, this result is not general and depends on the assumption
of quadratic utility. The result may be generalized to other utility functions that are
\regular", but it is easy to see that we may ¯nd examples of strictly concave utilities for
which it fails to hold.
The second observation is that the result is robust to changes in the information struc-
ture. One change is particularly important and, in some sense, is the opposite case of
collusion. In the model we assume that the experts' ideal points are common knowledge;
let's now assume that each expert does not know the ideal point of the other, but that
the policy maker knows both of them: the equilibrium is robust to this change. This
also is a very important property: it is plausible to assume that the policy maker knows
both the experts (he may have chosen them...); however there is no reason to assume
that experts know each other perfectly. In the equilibrium described above, each expert
knows that his message induces a point on the tangent line of his own indi®erence curve
at the policy maker's ideal point. He does not need to know completely the other expert's
utility function; he just needs to know that the policy maker is informed: in equilibrium
the policy maker \neutralizes" the other expert's bias and forces a choice on his tangent
line. Notice, however, that the gradient of both utility functions at the ideal point of
the policy maker must be common knowledge in order to construct the new \coordinate
system" used in the equilibrium. This is an interesting point: it is not in the interest of
18the policy maker that experts ignore each other characteristics: the policy maker wants
them to be aware of their con°ict of interest.
The most important characteristic of this equilibrium, however, is that it yields insights
into the information transmission process that can not be appreciated in the analysis of
the one-dimensional case. The ¯rst and most important has been mentioned, and was
commented in the introduction: the importance of the local behavior of the experts utilities
at the policy maker's ideal point. In one dimension, clearly there is only one direction
of increasing of utility. In two dimensions, the issue of determining in which direction
utility increases most is very important and is a key variable in any equilibrium. Using
information on gradients, it is possible to exploit the experts' con°ict of interest in the
optimal way. The tangent of the experts' indi®erence curve at the policy maker's ideal
point is important because we know it is the only direction of \movement" in which the
utility of the expert decreases for any deviant message. Forcing the expert to induce a
point in this locus is a crucial ingredient of the equilibrium.
A related point, which, as we discussed in the introduction, has important implica-
tions for the informational theory of legislative organizations, is that the proximity of
ideal points is not important for information transmission. In the equilibrium that we
constructed, for example, distance is not important at all: if ideal points are linearly
independent, then even if they are arbitrarily distant, we can construct a fully revealing
equilibrium.
Last, but not least, the analysis of the two-dimensional case yields useful insights also
into the study of the \open vs. closed" rule question. In equilibrium each agent i is given
complete power to decide the policy outcome on the li dimension, so we may say that the
equilibrium resembles a closed rule. However, this would be only super¯cially true. In
the one-dimensional case the policy choice is trivially irrelevant; in the two dimensional
case the dimensions of choice are endogenous, part of the equilibrium. It is true that i
has the choice on the ith dimension, but this dimension was chosen by the policy maker
in the optimal way: i is free to choose the outcome on that dimension, but in equilibrium
he is forced to be honest! The analysis of the multidimensional case, therefore, revisits
the notion of `open' and `closed' rule and questions the relevance of this distinction.
We conclude this section with two somewhat more technical remarks:
1) In the model, we use quadratic utilities for simplicity: it is not di±cult to see that
the results hold under the general assumption of concave utility functions. The condition
x1 6= ®x2 8® is necessary here because we have assumed quadratic utilities, in general,
if we assume concave utilities, it is not necessary: we need rui (0;0);ruj (0;0) to be
linearly independent. If this condition holds, in fact, we can construct a new coordinate
system exactly in the same way as in Proposition 3.
192) If utility functions are not di®erentiable (for example, Leontiev utilities) but are
concave, then the results still hold: in this case we have a multiplicity of equilibria that,
exactly in the same way as Proposition 3, achieve a fully revealing equilibrium.
3) In the previous section we analyzed the case with two Experts and two dimensions.
However two Experts are su±cient for full revelation also in more then two dimensions.
Consider the three dimensional case27. Consider Expert i (i = 1 or 2) and ¯x the
plane that is tangent to his indi®erence curve at the policy maker's ideal point, call this
plane Ti: For Expert 1, ¯x one vector on T1; call it v1: For Expert 2, ¯x two linearly




2g span the three-dimensional
space. Consider an equilibrium in which the declaration of Expert1 is interpreted as
a coordinate in the v1 dimension; the declaration of Expert 228 is interpreted as the
coordinate in the v2
1,v2
2 dimension. Given that Expert 1 reports the truth, Expert 2 will
have to choose a point on T2; by construction the optimal choice in T2 is the ideal point
of the policy maker, so Expert 2 will reveal the true coordinate (in the v2
1,v2
2 coordinate
system); given that Expert 2 is honest, Expert 1 will have to choose a point in v1 and
therefore is honest. This argument can be generalized to four dimensions and two experts.
3.2.2 Sequential referrals
When experts report simultaneously the condition required by the equilibrium constructed
in Proposition 3 is not su±cient to guarantee the existence of a fully revealing equilibrium.
To see what may go wrong in the argument made in the previous section when experts
report sequentially consider Figure 4. Assume that the state of the world is µ (the thick
arrow). Consider the following deviation for Expert 1, the ¯rst to report: instead of
reporting a2(µ), he reports s1(µ) = a2(µ) ¡ " as the l2 coordinate. If Expert 2 observe
this choice, Expert 1 will know that Expert 2 will choose a point in the locus that have
coordinate l2 equal to a2(µ)¡(a2(µ)¡") = " in the l1;l2 coordinate system. But now the
optimal choice in this locus is point M, which is preferred by both Experts to the origin.
Therefore Proposition 3 does not necessarily hold if experts report sequentially.
As we said in the introduction, Krishna and Morgan [1999a] have proven that when
experts report sequentially and there is only one dimension, no fully revealing equilibrium
exists: it is natural to ask whether in a multidimensional environment there is a su±cient
condition for the existence of a fully revealing equilibrium.
The reason why in the example of Fig 4, there are problems is that Expert 1, given the
policy maker's strategy, knows that if he gives the opportunity to Expert 2 to determine
an outcome M that also Expert 2 prefers, then also Expert 2 will lie. Given the reaction
27I thank David Austen Smith for this observation.







Figure 4: Sequential referrals: example of a pro¯table deviation.
function of Expert 2, we may ¯nd the points that Expert 1 may induce, i.e. the points
that given the message of Expert 1 the optimal message of Expert 2 would determine. If
among these points there is a point that 1 prefers to 0 then we have a pro¯table deviation
and no more a fully revealing equilibrium. To ¯nd a su±cient condition for a fully
revealing equilibrium we have to ¯nd a condition that guarantees that 0 is the best point
for Expert 1 among the points that he may induce. This turns out to be very simple.
Proposition 5 If d=2, then for any x1 and x2 such that x1 6= ®x2 8® and ru1(0;0) ¤
ru2(0;0) = 0 there exists a fully revealing, " ¡ stable equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the same strategies of Proposition 1. Expert 1 can induce any point
x = ¯x2 : i.e. any point that is a linear combination of x2 and the origin. In fact,
8a 2 < chosen by Expert 1, Expert 2 will choose a point such that l2(a) is tangent to
the indi®erence curve: for any choice of a the locus of such points is ¯x2 8¯ 2 <. So
by choosing a, Expert 1 can induce any point on this locus. However since ru1(0;0) ¤
ru2(0;0) = 0. the origin is the point that expert 1 prefers among the ones that he may
induce.
The intuition for Proposition 6 may be seen in Figure 5. If the direction of Expert 1's
highest increase of utility is not orthogonal to the one of Expert 2 (in the picture rui(0;0)










Figure 5: Illustration of the su±cient condition for existence of a fully revealing equilib-
rium with sequential referrals
0: if the gradients, instead, are orthogonal, the point that Expert 1 prefers among the
ones that he may induce is 0, the policy maker's ideal point.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that there are important insights to be gained from the
analysis of multidimensional cheap talk: it is not just a technical change in the model, the
results are qualitatively di®erent. Contrary to the one-dimensional case, full revelation
of information is typically possible in two dimensions (or more) and the equilibrium that
supports this outcome has very good properties: it is robust to perturbations of the
model such as errors in Experts' information, sequential reports or collusion. Clearly full
revelation is due to some simplifying assumptions and should not be expected literally in
real life; however we believe the results are important for at least two reasons:
1) The assumptions made are the same, mutatis mutandis, to the ones made in models
in the one-dimension.
2) The model sheds light on the mechanics of information transmission and yields
insight into, and a new interpretation of, the information transmission process.
22In particular, this second point is important. We discussed the implication of this the-
ory in the \informational" theories vs.\distributional" theories debate and we have seen
that the theory presented here seems to explain an empirical puzzle: in particular, we
argued that the fact that the \outlier principle" is not clearly supported by empirical ev-
idence is not su±cient to reject informational theories of legislative organization (ITLO).
Our argument, on the other hand, is not su±cient to reject distributional theories in favor
of ITLO either: new evidence that takes in consideration the multidimensionality of prob-
lems is needed. This work suggests new empirical tests. In particular, more than the
absolute \distance" of ideal points, empirical studies should look for \complementaries"
in experts' preferences: experts that have distant ideal points with respect to the policy
maker, but also have considerable con°icts of interests among themselves along di®erent
dimensions of problems, may reveal information. These con°icts of interest in di®er-
ent dimensions (complementaries) could be detected if they are relevant for information
transmission.
The paper has not considered many further interesting questions: probably the most
important is endogeneity of information acquisition by Experts. The design of an optimal
organization should reward Experts for the e®ort they put in the information acquisition.
This may force the policy maker to limit his own ability to extract information. One way
to do this is to separate jurisdictions in the policy space, giving autonomy to di®erent
policy makers who control distinct dimensions of the problem: this may lead to imperfect
information transmission and grant some residual rent to Experts. This extension is left
for further research.
235 Appendix
5.1 Proof of lemma 1
Step 1. (there is a truthful fully revealing equilibrium) Assume that ¹(s1(µ);s2(µ));
y(s1(µ);s2(µ)); si(µ) for i 2 f1;2g is a fully revealing equilibrium. De¯ne e ¹(x0;x) =
¹(s1(x0);s2(x)) and e y(x0;x) = y(s1(x0);s2(x)). Then e ¹(e s1; e s2); e si = µ for i 2 f1;2g,
e y(e s1; e s2) is a truthful fully revealing equilibrium. Assume not. Then one player has a
strictly preferred deviation. Assume expert i prefers to report µ
0 in state µ: If s1(µ
0) =
s1(µ) then this generates the same belief and the same policy maker's action: so it can
not be strictly preferred. If s1(µ
0) 6= s1(µ) then the deviation was available also in the
previous equilibrium, but this is a contradiction. A similar argument can be applied to
the policy maker.
Step 2. (degenerate out of equilibrium beliefs) For any equilibrium with out of
equilibrium belief ¹(s1(µ);s2(µ))(µ) the optimal choice of the policy maker is y(µ
0;µ) =
¡E¹(s1(µ);s2(µ))(µ) and if the out of equilibrium beliefs are non degenerate, then there is an
outcome equivalent equilibrium with degenerate beliefs, i.e. that assign probability one
on one value of µ: Given the belief ¹, in fact, consider the expected utility of the policy
maker Eu(µ;y) = ¡
R P2
i=1(µi ¡yi)2¹(µ)dµ; where the subscript indicates the coordinate


















i + E¹(µi)2 ¡2yiE¹(µi))¹(µ)dµ + K
= ¡
P2
i=1(E¹(µi) ¡ yi)2 + K
where K is a constant that does not depend on yi: The optimal choice, therefore, is
y(µ
0;µ) = ¡E¹(µ): Since the optimal choice depends only on E¹(µ); we may introduce an




1 if µ = E¹(µ)
0 else (8)
5.2 Proof of proposition 1
Necessary condition. We prove that for W ¸ jx1j + jx2j we may ¯nd a truthful
fully revealing equilibrium. Without loss of generality assume x2 > 0 and x1 < 0: For
any couple µ
0;µ an equilibrium speci¯es a posterior belief for the policy maker on the
distribution of µ; ¹(µ
0;µ). In a truthful fully revealing equilibrium ¹(µ;µ)(µ) = 1; i.e.
the belief distribution is degenerate and assigns probability 1 to state µ: Given an out of
equilibrium couple µ
0;µ the posterior distribution is not necessarily degenerate. However,
it su±ces to prove that there is a fully revealing equilibrium with out of equilibrium belief
24that assign positive probability only on one point. With a slight abuse of notation call
this point ¹(µ
0;µ): i.e. given µ
0;µ; the policy maker will believe that the true state is
¹(µ
0;µ) with probability one.
For any couple µ
0;µ we only have to ¯nd ¹(µ
0;µ) such that:
u1(µ ¡ ¹(µ
0;µ)) ￿ u1(0) (9)
u2(µ
0 ¡ ¹(µ
0;µ)) ￿ u2(0) (10)
The interpretation of (9) and (10) is thefollowing. If the true stateis µ , then µ¡¹(µ
0;µ)
is the outcome if expert 1 deviates and declares µ
0 : (9) just requires that for any state
of the world µ; any deviation from the equilibrium is not strictly pro¯table for 1. This
condition is not enough for an equilibrium; we also need that ¹(µ
0;µ) is such that in state
µ
0 expert 2 doesn't want to deviate: given, in fact, that the couple (µ
0;µ) induces the belief
¹(µ
0;µ) we want to rule out the case in which in state µ
0 experts 2 deviates reporting µ;
this is the reason we impose also the other inequality. Inequality (9) implies that one of
the following two inequalities is satis¯ed:
a1 µ ¡ ¹(µ
0;µ) ¸ 0 ) ¹(µ
0;µ) ￿ µ
a2 µ ¡ ¹(µ
0;µ) ￿ 2x1 ) ¹(µ
0;µ) ¸ µ ¡ 2x1







There exist an equilibrium if for all the out of equilibrium couples we can ¯nd a ¹(µ
0;µ)
such that one inequality of the ¯rst group and one of the second are simultaneously
satis¯ed and ¹(µ
0;µ) 2 [¡W;W] : i.e. there is no incentive to deviate and the belief is in
the support of µ: We consider the possible cases and we show that the set of beliefs that
satisfy the required conditions is non empty for any couple (µ
0;µ):
Case 1. If µ
0 ￿ µ then we may satisfy a1 and b1 choosing ¹(µ
0;µ) 2 [µ
0;µ]:
Case 2. Case 2.1: µ
0 > µ; µ ¸ 0: Consider b2 and a1, so ¹ ￿ min(µ
0 ¡ 2x2;µ). If
µ
0¡2x2 ¸ ¡W just take¹(µ
0;µ) 2 [¡W;min(µ
0 ¡ 2x2;µ)]: it is possiblesince [¡W;min(µ
0¡
2x2;µ)] would be non empty. If µ
0 ¡ 2x2 < ¡W then we have that:
µ
0 < 2x2 ¡W and j2x2j > W so jx1j < jx2j (11)
The ¯rst inequality follows by simple manipulation; the second follows by the fact that
µ
0 ¸ 0 so 2x2 > W and by W ¸ jx1j+jx2j we have j2x2j > W ¸ jx1j+jx2j ) jx1j < jx2j
Consider then a2 and b1. Inequality a2 requires ¹(µ
0;µ) ¸ µ ¡ 2x1 which is implied
by ¹(µ
0;µ) ¸ µ
0 ¡ 2x1 since µ
0 > µ which is implied by ¹(µ
0;µ) ¸ 2x2 ¡ W ¡ 2x1because
of the ¯rst inequality of (11). By the assumption W ¸ jx1j + jx2j we have 2x2 ¡ W ¡
252x1 ￿ W so the set [2x2 ¡ W ¡ 2x1;W] is not empty and it is just su±cient to take
¹ 2 [2x2 ¡ W ¡ 2x1;W]:
Case 2.2 µ
0 > µ; µ < 0: Case 2.2.1 µ
0 > µ; µ < 0;µ
0 ¸ 0; by a1 and b2 it is su±cient
¹ ￿ min(¡W;;µ
0 ¡ 2x2) : if µ
0 ¡ 2x2 ¸ ¡W choose ¹(µ
0;µ) = ¡W: If µ
0 ¡ 2x2 < ¡W
then 11 holds. Consider a2 and b1 which are satis¯ed if ¹ ¸ max(W;µ ¡ 2x1) but µ < 0
and, by the second inequality of 11, j2x1j < W so just choose ¹ = W:
Case 2.2.2 . µ
0 > µ; µ < 0;µ
0 < 0: Inequalities b2 and a1 are satis¯ed if ¹ ￿
min(¡W;µ
0 ¡ 2x2): if µ
0 ¡ 2x2 ¸ ¡W choose ¹(µ
0;µ) = ¡W. If µ
0 ¡ 2x2 < ¡W then
the ¯rst inequality of (11) holds. Then consider a2 and b1 which are implied by ¹ >
max(µ
0;µ ¡ 2x1) which is implied by ¹ > µ
0 ¡ 2x1 since µ < µ
0 , which is implied by
¹(µ
0;µ) ¸ 2x2 ¡ W ¡ 2x1. As in case 2.1, by the assumption W ¸ jx1j + jx2j we have
2x2 ¡ W ¡ 2x1 ￿ W so the set [2x2 ¡ W ¡ 2x1;W] is not empty and it is just su±cient
to take ¹ 2 [2x2 ¡W ¡ 2x1;W]:
Therefore for any deviation we can ¯nd the required out of equilibrium belief such
that the deviation is not strictly pro¯table.
Su±cient condition: we prove that if W < jx1j + jx2j then there can not exist a
fully revealing equilibrium. By lemma 1 it su±ces to show that no truthful fully revealing
equilibrium with degenerate out of equilibrium beliefs exists. For this we just need to
prove that there exist a µ and a µ
0 such that no couple of inequality a and b can be
satis¯ed. Consider µ
0 = minf2x2 ¡ W ¡ ";W ¡ "g and µ = µ
0 ¡ " for " > 0 arbitrarily
small.
Since µ
0 < 2x2 ¡ W condition b2 never holds. Condition b2, in fact, would require
¹(µ
0;µ) ￿ µ
0 ¡ 2x2 < ¡W ) ¹(µ
0;µ) < ¡W which is not possible since ¹(µ
0;µ) must
belong to the support of µ: If b2 does not hold the possible couple of inequalities that
can be satis¯ed are a1, b1 and a2, b1. Inequalities a1 and b1 clearly never hold together.
Consider a2. If 2x2 ¡ W ¡ " < W ¡ " then
¹ ¸ µ ¡ 2x1 = 2x2 ¡ W ¡ 2" ¡ 2x1 > 2x2 ¡ 2" ¡ 2x1 ¡ x2 + x1 = x2 ¡ x1 ¡ 2" > W
since " is arbitrarily small and by assumption W < jx1j + jx2j:
If 2x2 ¡ W ¡ " ¸ W ¡ " then
¹ ¸ µ ¡ 2x1 = W ¡ 2" ¡2x1 > W
since x1 < 0 and j"j < jx1j: In either case we have a contradiction and so also inequality
a2 can not hold.
265.3 Proof of proposition 2
Once we introduce ²-stability, Lemma 1 does not necessarily hold. In the proof of Lemma
1, in fact, we have exploited the indeterminacy of out of equilibrium beliefs, but now ²-
stability restricts the set of feasible out of equilibria beliefs. To see that we may have a
f.r.e. that is not truthful, consider this case: each expert is pooling, and the declaration of
each expert reveals that the state is in a set (say Ai for agent i); however the intersection
of the two sets is a singleton and, so, information is fully revealed. With "¡stability
the out-of-equilibrium beliefs depend on the equilibrium strategies (i.e. on the sets Ai).
In particular, it may be possible that, through choice of the sets Ai, we may construct
out-of-equilibrium beliefs that support full revelation: such an equilibrium would clearly
have beliefs that are di®erent from the case of truthful strategies. Therefore, in order
to prove that there exists no ²-stable f.r.e., it is not enough to prove that there exists no
²-stable truthful fully revealing equilibrium. For this reason, in the following proof we do
not invoke Lemma 1.
Assume that there exists a fully revealing equilibrium. For any message si sent in
equilibrium by agent i de¯ne a set: Ai(si) :=
n
e µ 2 £
¯ ¯ ¯si(e µ) = si
o
. If there exists a
fully revealing equilibrium, it must be that for any µ, A1(s1(µ)) \ A2(s2(µ)) = fµg: Two
conditions must be satis¯ed.
1. If there exist a f.r.e. and one agent pools, then the other agent will be able to choose
any point in the pooling set: otherwise some state would never be revealed. In particular,





2. To have incentive compatibility, it is necessary that agent j doesn't strictly prefer
any point µ
0 in Ai(si(µ)) to µ: For this reason, it must be that for any tl+1;tl 2 A1(s1)
such that tl+1 > tl, then tl+1 ¸ tl +2x2. Assume not: if tl+1 < tl +2x2; then in state tl+1
agent 2 may report that the state is tl so the outcome would be 0 < tl+1 ¡ tl < 2x2: this
would be a pro¯table deviation for agent 2. In the same way, for vn+1;vn 2 A2(µ) such
that vn+1 < vn; it must be vn+1 ￿ vn + 2x1:
We now consider the beliefs that may follow after a pair of out-of equilibrium signals
s1(µ
0);s2(µ
00) if "-stability is satis¯ed; we then prove that given these beliefs we always
have a pro¯table deviation for at least one Expert.
For each l 2 Ai(µ); the posterior probability that the state is l given the true state




29. Consider two states of nature µ
0;µ
00 2 [¡B;B] for
29As an heuristic justi¯cation for this consider A2(µ;±) = f[l1;l1 +±];[l2;l2 +±];::g so, by Bayes' rule,
p([l1;l1 +±]jA2(µ;±)) =
F(l1+±)¡F(l1) P







f(k) as ± ! 0: For details consult Kolmogorov [1950], par.
27B < minfjx1j;jx2jg and µ
0 6= µ
00: For Expert 1; consider the set A1(s1(µ
0)) so that, by
the choice of B, A1(s1(µ
0)) n fµ
0g = 2 [¡B;B]; in the same way, for Expert 2, consider the
set A2(s2(µ
00)): as before A2(s2(µ
00) n fµ
























Since, by the existence of the ¯rst moment of the distribution, the second term of the
numerator of the last expression converges to zero as x2 converges to 1; it must be that,
for x2 large enough, E(µjA1(s1(µ
0)) 2 [¡e B; e B] where e B 2 (B;minfjx1j;jx2jg). In the
same way we can prove that E(µ jA2(s2(µ
00)) 2 [¡e B; e B] for x1 large enough in absolute
value. Given the equilibrium strategies, in any "n-perturbed game the event \observation
of the couple s1(µ
0);s2(µ
00) by the policy maker" is the union of three disjoint events:
a : event in which agent 1 is right and agent 2 observes the wrong state;
b : event in which agent 2 is right and agent 2 observes the wrong state;
c : event in which both agents observes the wrong state.
So30 in any "n-perturbedgameand for any G(¢); E(µ jA1;A2) = E(µ jA1(µ))p(ajA1;A2)+
E(µjA2(µ))p(bjA1;A2)+E(µ)p(cjA1;A2): ThereforeE(µ jA1;A2) 2 [¡e B; e B] for minfjx1j;jx2jg
large enough. It follows that, after a pair s1(µ
0);s2(µ
00), beliefs must be in [¡e B; e B] as
"n ! 0: but then, by Proposition 1, since e B < jx1j + jx2j, we may ¯nd µ
0;µ
00 in [¡e B; e B]
such that either Expert 1 has a pro¯table deviation in state µ
00 or Expert 2 has a prof-
itable deviation in state µ
0: Since this holds for any distribution of the wrong signal for
the experts G(¢) and any converging sequence "n, it follows that no out-of-equilibrium
belief that satisfy the requirement of " ¡ stability supports a f.r.e.
3, page 51.
30The probabilities p(kjA1;A2) for k = a;b;c are constructed with Bayes' rule following the logic
described in note 25: they will depend on f(¢) and g(¢) and the sequence "n. It is not necessary to
specify them since we only need them to be in [0;1].
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